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Philosophical bias is the one
bias that science cannot avoid
Abstract Scientists seek to eliminate all forms of bias from their research. However, all scientists also
make assumptions of a non-empirical nature about topics such as causality, determinism and
reductionism when conducting research. Here, we argue that since these ’philosophical biases’
cannot be avoided, they need to be debated critically by scientists and philosophers of science.
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S
cientists are keen to avoid bias of any
kind because they threaten scientific
ideals such as objectivity, transparency
and rationality. The scientific community has
made substantial efforts to detect, explicate and
critically examine different types of biases (Sack-
ett, 1979; Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis, 2018;
Macleod et al., 2015). One example of this is
the catalogue of all the biases that affect medi-
cal evidence compiled by the Centre for Evi-
dence Based Medicine at Oxford University
(catalogueofbias.org). Such awareness is com-
monly seen as a crucial step towards making sci-
ence objective, transparent and free from bias.
There is, however, one exception to this rule,
which we call ’philosophical bias’. These are
basic implicit assumptions in science about how
the world is (ontology), what we can know about
it (epistemology), or how science ought to be
practiced (norms). As we shall see, philosophical
biases influence, justify and enable scientific
practice: in short, they are an integral part of
science.
Basic philosophical assumptions count as
biases because they skew the development of
hypotheses, the design of experiments, the eval-
uation of evidence, and the interpretation of
results in specific directions. In our own research,
we look at biases related to ontological, episte-
mological and normative assumptions about
causality, probability and complexity. To give an
example related to causality: when choosing a
scientific method to establish a causal relation-
ship between some medical condition and a
virus, one must first have an idea of what causal-
ity is. This is a part of science that cannot be dis-
covered empirically, but remains tacitly assumed
in scientific methodology and practice.
Examples of philosophical bias
Doing science without making any basic philo-
sophical assumptions is impossible. But are all
philosophical assumptions biases? No. Some-
times these assumptions are chosen deliberately
and explicitly by the scientist, and used as auxil-
iary premises for theoretical purposes. For
instance, one might adopt a philosophical
assumption such as determinism to make a cer-
tain model work. Determinism is the assumption
that, given a set of initial conditions, there is
only one possible outcome. For instance, we
could build a model of population growth which
assumes that growth is completely determined
by the initial population density: any deviations
from the predictions of this model could, there-
fore, be taken as evidence that factors other
than the initial conditions have an influence on
population growth (Higgins et al., 1997). So
even if one does not believe that determinism or
some other philosophical assumption is true in
all situations, making such an assumption can
still serve a purpose.
When philosophical premises are chosen
explicitly and purposely in this way, we would
not call them ’biases’. In most cases, however,
scientists remain unaware of these assumptions
and of how they influence research. When a
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philosophical premise is implicitly accepted in
our theories and methods, it becomes a philo-
sophical bias. How does this affect the life
sciences?
Philosophical biases are typically acquired
from science education, professional practice or
other disciplinary traditions that define a scien-
tific paradigm. This is why scientists with
varying backgrounds might adopt different phil-
osophical biases. Biology, for example, is con-
cerned with both entities and processes
(Nicholson and Dupré, 2018). The standard
ontological assumption is that entities (such as
proteins) are more fundamental than processes,
and that processes are produced by interacting
entities. Molecular biologists have traditionally
taken this as the default position. The ability of
entities, such as proteins, to interact with each
other is determined by their chemical structure,
so to understand processes (such as the interac-
tions between proteins), we need to understand
the entities themselves in detail.
However, some scientists take the view that
processes are more fundamental than entities
(Guttinger, 2018). In this view, entities are
understood as being the result of processes that
are stable over some length of time, and the
best way to understand the behavior of an entity
is to study the relations it has with other entities,
rather than its internal structure. Ecologists tend
to take this view, thinking in terms of systems in
which the properties of individuals and species
are determined by their relationships with each
other and their environment.
The tension between these two ontological
positions is not a purely philosophical or abstract
point, it can have practical consequences. Ecolo-
gists and molecular biologists, for example, had
different views about GM crops in early debates
about their safety: ecologists focused on the
unpredictability of environmental effects caused
by GM crops, and had no strong opinions on
similarities and differences between GM crops
and conventional crops. Molecular biologists, on
the other hand, stressed the fundamental equiv-
alence between GM crops and conventional
crops, while dismissing issues related to the
predictability of environmental effects
(Kvakkestad et al., 2007). Two of the present
authors (ER and FA) have studied a similar clash
of philosophical biases in the debate about the
safety of stacked GM plants (that is, plants
where conventional breeding techniques are
applied to GM plants; Rocca and Andersen,
2017). One school of thought viewed the new
plant as a conventional hybrid and argued that,
in most cases, one can deduce the safety of the
new plant from knowledge of the safety of its
parental GM plants. This means thinking about
complexity as being various combinations of
unchanging parts. The other school, however,
argued that one cannot deduce the safety of the
new plant from the safety of the parental GM
plants. Here, complexity is thought of as an
emergent matter where parts lose their proper-
ties and identity in the process of interaction.
It is crucial that decision-makers (such as gov-
ernments and regulatory agencies) are aware of
these non-empirical aspects of science when
introducing laws and regulations in controversial
areas.
Philosophical debates in science
and medicine
Do scientists usually care about philosophical
biases? In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas Kuhn introduced the idea of paradigms
and paradigm shifts in science. Within a scientific
paradigm, there is general consensus among
researchers about the main theories, central con-
cepts, relevant research questions, standard
research procedures and basic mechanisms.
Kuhn called this phase ’normal science’, and
argued that the role of the scientist was to fill in
the gaps in our knowledge within the paradigm.
Therefore, in times of normal science, there is lit-
tle need for or interest in philosophical discus-
sions on the foundations of a subject. However,
according to Kuhn, when scientists start engag-
ing in philosophical debates about their subject,
a paradigm shift might be imminent
(Kuhn, 1962). The most famous example of a
paradigm shift is probably the emergence of
quantum theory in physics, which challenged
basic assumptions concerning the nature of cau-
sation, time, space and determinism. Philosophi-
cal debates between Einstein, Bohr and others
Doing science without making any
basic philosophical assumptions is
impossible. But are all philosophical
assumptions biases?
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had a central role in the development of quan-
tum theory.
Ongoing philosophical debates in medicine
about a number of topics — such as approaches
for informing medical decisions, models for
understanding health and illness, and scientific
norms for gathering medical knowledge
(Greenhalgh et al., 2014; Loughlin et al., 2018;
Anjum and Mumford, 2018) — might indicate
that there is a paradigmatic crisis. One discus-
sion is about the biomedical model of health
and illness, which has been a dominant view in
medicine for many decades. Critics of this model
have argued that it is reductionist in nature,
meaning that medical causes and medically rele-
vant explanations are limited to the physical
level, thus ignoring the causal influence of psy-
chological, social and other higher-level factors
on human biology (Engel, 1977).
Another philosophical debate in medicine
concerns randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
and their assumed status as the gold standard
for establishing causation. In an RCT, an inter-
vention is understood to be causal if the out-
comes for the test group (the group receiving
the intervention) and the outcomes for the con-
trol group are different in a statistically signifi-
cant way. According to the norms of evidence-
based medicine, the results from RCTs should
guide clinical decisions about individual patients
(Howick, 2011). However, this immediately
leads to a tension between the public health
perspective, where health advice is given at the
level of populations, and the clinical perspective,
where health advice is given to individual
patients. It could be argued that treating a
patient on the basis of what works best for a
group is an example of the ecological fallacy;
that is, of inferring from group to individual.
However, this inference is valid under a philo-
sophical assumption called frequentism, accord-
ing to which individual propensities are derived
from statistical frequencies. In this way, tensions
in medical thinking and practice can have their
origins in ontological, epistemological and nor-
mative biases.
Should science aim to overcome
philosophical biases?
Normally, awareness is the first step towards
overcoming some form of bias. However, this
does not work in the case of philosophical
biases. We saw that basic assumptions are fun-
damental premises for science. They represent
the lens through which we see new information.
So even when these assumptions are explicated
and challenged, all we can do is replace them
with alternative biases. In denying dualism,
reductionism or determinism, for instance, one
still has to adopt an alternative, such as holism,
emergence or indeterminism. Why should scien-
tists inconvenience themselves with this
process?
First, explicating philosophical biases is useful
because it reveals competing perspectives
(Douglas, 2000). This is crucial for scientific
progress. Moreover, it also stops science from
becoming a dogmatic enterprise. For instance,
the health hazard from exposure to complex
chemical mixtures, such as petroleum, has tradi-
tionally been calculated by grouping its compo-
nents in fractions with similar chemical
properties and, therefore, similar intrinsic toxic-
ity and bioavailability. Each fraction is assigned a
’reference dose’, which is the maximum dose
considered safe (based on laboratory experi-
ments and short-term monitoring after previous
oil spills), and a mathematical formula is then
used to combine the reference doses for each
fraction and predict the health hazard from the
mixture (Vorhees and Butler, 1999).
However, this approach to calculating health
hazards is basically a form of reductionism
(Hohwy and Kallestrup, 2008) because it is
based on breaking down a chemical mixture into
smaller parts, analyzing these parts in isolation,
and then recombining them. This approach was
considered for a long time the most scientifically
reliable, but more recently the assumption that
the most reductionist methodologies are also
the most scientifically reliable has been ques-
tioned (Peterson et al., 2003). A competing
assumption is that new hazards emerge at the
level of the whole that cannot be found by
studying its parts: this means that interactions
between the parts can lead to changes within
the parts themselves, and also to changes of the
whole (Anjum and Mumford, 2017). This latter
Normally, awareness is the first step
towards overcoming some form of
bias. However, this does not work in
the case of philosophical biases.
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approach, based on philosophical assumptions
different to those that underpin the traditional
approach, led to a form of hazard prediction
called ecosystem-based toxicology
(Peterson et al., 2003).
Second, philosophical biases can influence
the evaluation of scientific results, especially
when the biases are epistemological in nature.
Given the same evidence, some scientists might
consider reliability, or internal validity, as the
most important epistemic quality. Generally,
these scientists require evidence from RCTs,
where confounding factors are strictly con-
trolled, in order to claim causation, and they
tend to be skeptical about epidemiological evi-
dence (Allmers et al., 2009). Other scientists
might prefer to have converging evidence from
more than one type of method, such as a combi-
nation of epidemiological evidence, a dose-
response relationship and a plausible mecha-
nisms (Osimani and Mignini, 2015). And still,
other scientists might emphasize external valid-
ity, with evidence from a representative sample
of relevant cases, plus evidence of a causal
mechanism, being sufficient to establish causa-
tion (Anjum and Rocca, 2018; Hicks, 2015;
Edwards, 2018). Scientists supporting any one
of these stances should ideally be able to argue
for why their epistemological bias should be
considered superior. Awareness of the bias is a
necessary premise for any such argument.
We need to talk about science and
philosophy
What can be done to facilitate and encourage
debate about philosophical biases in science?
Recognizing philosophical biases is a good start-
ing point, but the responsibility for this cannot
be left to the individual scientists. Instead, we
need to develop a culture in the scientific com-
munity for critically discussing conceptual and
meta-empirical issues: this should involve univer-
sities, research institutes and journals. Philoso-
phers of science should contribute to this
process by working to engage with students and
researchers in discussions about the philosophi-
cal foundation of scientific norms, methods and
practices.
At our own institute, the NMBU Centre for
Applied Philosophy of Science in Norway, we
find that students and researchers become inter-
ested in discussing these matters once they are
made aware of them. The Norwegian higher
education system has a long tradition of manda-
tory training in the philosophy of science for
Masters and PhD students, and Polish universi-
ties are famous for the rigorous scientific training
received by philosophy of science students.
These initiatives point in the direction that we
want to see: philosophically informed scientists
and scientifically informed philosophers of sci-
ence who are prepared to debate with each
other on topics that are highly relevant to both.
Note
This Feature Article is part of the Philosophy of
Biology collection
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Tonelli M, Buetow S. 2018. Treating real people:
science and humanity. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical
Practice 24:919–929. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.
13024, PMID: 30159956
Macleod MR, Lawson McLean A, Kyriakopoulou A,
Serghiou S, de Wilde A, Sherratt N, Hirst T, Hemblade
R, Bahor Z, Nunes-Fonseca C, Potluru A, Thomson A,
Baginskaite J, Egan K, Vesterinen H, Currie GL,
Churilov L, Howells DW, Sena ES. 2015. Risk of bias in
reports of in vivo research: a focus for improvement.
PLOS Biology 13:e1002301. DOI: https://doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pbio.1002301, PMID: 26556632
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